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PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA DURING 
THE POST-BROWN DECADE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Davison Douglas recently painted a perceptive por-
trait of how several southern states, most notably North Caroli-
na, were able to minimize integration of their public primary 
and secondary schools during the decade after the Supreme 
Court issued Brown v. Board of Education. 1 Professor Douglas 
found that these jurisdictions, by practicing token integration 
and casting their rhetoric in comparatively conciliatory tones, 
managed to appear moderate on the issue of school desegrega-
tion. 2 This approach enabled the states to limit judicial scrutiny 
of their public educational systems and to experience somewhat 
less integration than their southern neighbors, such as Georgia, 
South Carolina, and Virginia, which opposed integration more 
adamantly.3 The jurisdictions that seemed restrained also re-
alized greater economic growth by creating perceptions of a 
climate conducive to business and of a society that enjoyed rela-
tively harmonious racial relations.4 
Professor Douglas ascertained that, ten years after Brown, 
North Carolina's public schools were less integrated than those 
of more defiant southern states,5 while North Carolina had 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana; B.A., 1968, Duke University; LL.B., 
1972, University of Virginia. I wish to thank Davison Douglas, Jon Entin, Michael 
Mayer, Richard McAdams, Peggy Sanner, Rod Smith, and Gail Stafford for valuable 
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and 
the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: 
Desegregating the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92 
(1994). 
2. See Douglas, supra note 1, at 94-97. 
3. See id. at 93-97. 
4. See id. at 96-97. 
5. See id. at 139; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil 
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 9-10 (1994); accord DAVISON M. DOUGLAS, READ-
1261 
1262 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1261 
maintained a reputation for moderation on racial issues and was 
reaping the image's advantages in terms of enhanced economic 
development.6 Professor Douglas concluded that this "result 
could not have been surprising" in a region ''historically beset 
with profound ironies when it came to matters of race.m 
Between 1953 and 1964, I attended public schools in Virginia, 
a state that Professor Douglas accurately characterizes as more 
recalcitrant than North Carolina.8 I, therefore, want to afford 
some personal recollections of this critical decade in national 
history and to compare important legal, political, and social 
developments involving integration in the Old Dominion with 
Professor Douglas's valuable account. 
Public education deserves emphasis for several reasons. Both 
practically and symbolically, schools proved to be the public 
institutions whose desegregation was most controversial. More-
over, the efforts to integrate public education trenchantly illus-
trate the inherent limitations of essentially legal approaches to 
issues as intractable as racial discrimination. I shall also exam-
ine briefly additional public facilities, principally swimming 
areas, and libraries, and certain private facilities, such as res-
taurants and bus stations, that were open to the public. 9 
I focus on Petersburg, Virginia, because I attended school 
there and because it is situated in Southside Virginia, an area of 
the Commonwealth that lies between the James River and 
North Carolina and between the City of Chesapeake and the 
ING, WRITING & RACE: THE DESEGREGATION OF THE CHARLOTTE SCHOOLS 49 (1995). 
6. Douglas, supra note 1, at 139. 
7. Id. See generally VALDIMER 0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 
(1949) (providing an overview of southern political systems); C. VANN WOODWARD, 
THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY (rev. ed. 1968) (discussing the relationship be-
tween southern history and contemporary events in the South). 
8. Douglas, supra note 1, at 93-94. 
9. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 58-61 (analyzing public and private facilities); 
Carl Tobias, Untenable, Unchristian and Unconstitutional, 58 Mo. L. REV. 855 (1993) 
(analyzing libraries); see also Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegrega-
tion Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1136-37 (1995) (affording citations to Supreme 
Court public facilities opinions); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and 
Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 
485, 505 (1978) (same). See generally Robert B. McKay, Segregation and Public Rec-
reation, 40 VA. L. REV. 697 (1954) (examining the integration of public recreational 
facilities). 
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Blue Ridge Mountains. Southside constituted the Old 
Dominion's "black belt"-a contiguous band of counties with the 
heaviest concentrations of blacks, named for its substantial 
black population and its "dark, rich soil that once supported the 
plantation aristocracy and its slaves."10 Indeed, blacks com-
prised almost half of Petersburg's approximately 40,000 resi-
dents at the time of the events that I recount. Southside resem-
bles the deep South, and the region led Virginia's battle against 
the integration of public education, preventing the desegregation 
of every school in the Commonwealth for a half-decade. 
Petersburg and Southside Virginia, by virtue of their location 
and history, were also unreconstructed, particularly in contrast 
to more metropolitan areas, such as Northern Virginia and 
Hampton Roads, and even in comparison to Richmond, the capi-
tal of the Confederate States of America. It is important to re-
member that white residents of Petersburg, Southside Virginia, 
and much of the South never have forgotten that Petersburg 
was the site where the Confederacy made its final stand in the 
''War of Northern Oppression" and that nearby Appomattox was 
the infamous place where the Confederate States surrendered. 
Issues of race have always been a fixture of daily existence for 
all Southerners, both white and black. Nonetheless, I remember, 
as a child in a middle-class white family that resided in a segre-
gated neighborhood, that racial issues affected my day-to-day 
activities infrequently, particularly in public school. We lived in 
the suburb of Walnut Hill, which, like almost every one of 
Petersburg's neighborhoods, was segregated. The deeds to most 
10. Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496; see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. 
POWELL, JR. 133 (1994) (discussing the disproportionately high black population in 
Southside); RoBERT A. PRATT, THE COLOR OF THEm SKIN: EDUCATION AND RACE IN 
RICHMOND, VmGINIA 1954-1989, at 4 (1992) (describing black-belt political districts); 
PARK RoUSE, JR., BELOW THE JAMES LIES DIXIE (1968) (detailing the history of 
Southside, Virginia); Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": A Study of 
School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 994 (1956) (defining the "South"). I 
employ the term "black" in referring to African Americans in part because the au-
thor of the piece to which I am responding does. Judicial opinions and commentary 
that were contemporaneous with Brown frequently employed the terms "Negro" and 
even "colored." See, e.g., Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430, 432 (E.D. Va.), 
affd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Harrison v. Day, 106 
S.E.2d 636, 640 (Va. 1959); see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 
202-03 n.1 (1994) (discussing why she chooses to use the term "black"). · 
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of Walnut Hill's lots included restrictive covenants, analogous to 
those invalidated by the Supreme Court in Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 11 that precluded property transfers to persons of Afri-
can descent.12 
Housing patterns were racially stratified in the city and in the 
surrounding counties of Dinwiddie and Prince George. Practical-
ly all of the whites who lived in "integrated" neighborhoods 
resided there because they could not afford to live elsewhere. My 
parents, like many middle-income whites, hired a black woman 
to help manage the household by cooking, cleaning, and caring 
for the children; however, my daily interactions with her rarely 
raised what I perceived to be issues of race. 
In January 1953, I began attending Walnut Hill Elementary 
School, a brand new, sprawling brick building that was sur-
rounded by grassy playing fields and to which most students 
could ride their bicycles. The city had constructed the education-
al facility so that pupils could learn at a modern structure and 
suburban parents would not have to transport their children to 
and from D.M. Brown Elementary School. D.M. Brown, the dete-
riorating, obsolete edifice that most of the parents had attended, 
was located in a rather seedy, concrete and steel part of down-
town Petersburg. 
Students at Walnut Hill Elementary were the consummate 
Baby Boomers. We were principally the children of war brides 
and their husbands, who had successfully fought World War II 
and wanted to recapture time that they had lost in waging the 
conflict. The primary school served the Walnut Hill district-a 
large neighborhood that, by legal construct, did not include 
blacks. All of the teachers and students at the school were 
white. Moreover, Walnut Hill Elementary remained segregated 
11. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
12. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 14 (discussing restrictive covenants); Louis 
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 
(1962) (analyzing Shelley). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1688-89, 1711-14 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Shelley and state action theo-
ry); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: 'l'HURGOOD MARsHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 81-98 (1994) (discussing attacks on restrictive cove-
nants); CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, 
AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959) (same). 
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from 1953 until I graduated from Petersburg High School in 
1964. 
In my early years, Walnut Hill Elementary was the locus of 
an incident implicating race that remains indelibly imprinted on 
my memory.13 .On the afternoon of May 17, 1954, the day that 
the Supreme Court issued Brown, my mother and I were driving 
past the school on a shopping trip. I was looking at the Peters-
burg Progress-Index, the afternoon newspaper that served our 
community. I asked my mother, a Pennsylvania native, what the 
one-inch high banner headline meant. She explained that the 
United States Supreme Court had struck down the "separate-
but-equal" doctrine, thereby requiring public schools to inte-
grate. I responded that I did not want to attend school with 
"niggers,'' and my mother administered the worst tongue lashing 
that I had experienced during my seven short years. Little did I 
know then that the Virginia General Assembly, principally by 
pursuing ''Massive .Resistance,'n4 and the Petersburg School 
Board, by devising additional ingenious means of evading inte-
gration, would enable me to realize my uninformed, childish 
wish. How the state and local powers managed to preserve es-
sentially segregated public schools for a decade with a degree of 
success nearly equal to North Carolina's is the story that I wish 
to relate. 
II. PuBLIC SCHOOL INTEGRATION 
Initial reactions to the Supreme Court's issuance of Brown 
varied significantly across the South. 15 The political leaders of 
13. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Carl Tobias, Correspondence, 10 
CONST. COMMENTARY 283 (1993). 
14. See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MAsSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE 
AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969) (describing the use of "mas-
sive resistance" in the South). 
15. See Douglas, supra note 1, at 98-100; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 6-24 
(analyzing developments that led to Brown); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LE-
GAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (same); Garrett 
Epps, The Littlest Rebel: James J. Kilpatrick and the Second Civil War, 10 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 19 (1993) (describing initial reactions). See generally RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK 
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975) (detailing the history surrounding the 
Brown decision); RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF 
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several states promptly and stridently denounced the Court.16 
For instance, Senator James Eastland of Mississippi vilified the 
Justices for perpetrating a "monstrous crime" in the "false name 
of law and justice."17 Governor Herman Talmadge of Georgia 
implacably proclaimed that the Court had reduced the Consti-
tution to a "mere scrap of paper'' and promised that the state 
would never integrate its schools during his tenure. 18 Indeed, 
Georgia and South Carolina anticipated Brown by abrogating 
constitutional requirements that the jurisdictions provide public 
education. 19 
A. Virginia 
More measured, immediate responses emanated from much of 
the South, including states such as Virginia, which would even-
tually formulate and spearhead the strategy of Massive Resis-
tance. Thomas Stanley, the Governor of the Old Dominion, 
pledged to devise a program that the Commonwealth's residents 
would find acceptable and that would honor the Court's edict. 20 
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., the state's attorney general, similarly 
asserted that the Old Dominion would take a realistic approach 
to Brown and would attempt ,to make "some rational adjust-
ment"21; however, Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Sr., intransigently 
decried the Court for usurping states' rights and predicted that 
the opinion would precipitate a "crisis of the first magnitude."22 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984) (detailing desegregation efforts). 
16. Douglas, supra note 1, at 98. 
17. DAVID R. GoLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN: RACE RELATIONS AND 
SOUTHERN CULTURE, 1940 TO THE PRESENT 75 (1990); see also REED SARRATT, THE 
ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION: THE FIRST DECADE 1 (1966) (reproducing a similarly 
defiant statement of Mississippi's governor). 
18. Constitution Ruined, Says Georgia Governor, DURHAM MORNING HERALD, May 
18, 1954, at 1. But cf. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 27-29 (documenting North Carolina 
Governor William Umstead's moderate response to Brown). 
19. See BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF INTEGRATION 
SINCE THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION 21 (1964). See generally McKay, supra 
note 10, at 1041-43 (discussing efforts by southern states to abrogate compulsory 
public education). 
20. See MUSE, supra note 19, at 21 (describing pledges made); see also CHARLES 
P. ROLAND, THE IMPROBABLE ERA: THE SOUTH SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 35 (1975) 
(detailing reactions to Brown). 
21. PRATT, supra note 10, at 99. 
22. Id. at 1-2 (quoting Byrd); Douglas, supra note 1, at 99 (quoting Almond). See 
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The mild initial reaction to Brown in much of the South rapid-
ly gave way to vociferous opposition as political leaders quickly 
came to appreciate the political popularity among white voters of 
a strong stance against integration.23 A mere five weeks after 
Brown's issuance, Governor Stanley defiantly announced that he 
would employ all legal means at his disposal to maintain segre-
gated public education, while twenty Southside Virginia legisla-
tors convened in Petersburg under state Senator Garland Gray's 
leadership and declared themselves "unalterably opposed" to 
school integration.24 
On August 30, 1954, the Governor appointed a commission 
comprised of thirty-two white members of the General Assembly 
to analyze Brown's effects and to make suggestions. 25 While the 
Gray Commission was undertaking its study and developing 
recommendations, the Supreme Court issued a second opinion in 
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown ll),26 which required 
school desegregation to begin at once and to proceed ''with all 
deliberate speed."27 
Brown II was controversial in 1955 and has remained so.28 
Some observers have asserted that the second Brown decision 
generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, HARRY BYRD AND THE CHANGING FACE OF Vm-
GINIA POLITICS, 1945-1966 (1968) (describing Byrd's political organization). · 
23. Douglas, supra note 1, at 99. 
24. PRATI', supra note 10, at 3-4 (discussing the Petersburg meeting); Virginia, S. 
SCH. NEWS, Sept. 3, 1954, at 13 (quoting Stanley). . 
25. See Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Va.), affd, 246 F.2d 
325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 
20 (discussing a similar North Carolina commission that included blacks); ROBBINS 
L. GATES, THE MAKING OF MAsSIVE RESISTANCE 34-36 (1964) (discussing the first 
Commission meeting at which Senator Gray was elected Chair). 
26. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
27. Id. at 300-01. 
28. Several commentators have chronicled this proposition. See, e.g., ALEXANDER 
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 68-72, 250-54 (1962); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-169 (1991); Charles L. Black, Jr., The 
Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 22-31 (1970); Robert 
A. Burt, Brown's Reflection, 103 YALE L.J. 1483, 1483-84 (1994); Robert L. Carter, 
The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 243-46 (1969); Klarman, 
supra note 5, at 10-11; Robert B. McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed": Legislatiue 
Reaction and Judicial Deuelopment 1956-57, 43 VA. L. REV. 1205, 1205-07 (1957); 
Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (1991). 
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undercut the power and moral authority of the :first.29 Numer-
ous states in the South seized upon Brown II to evade Brown's 
mandate or treated Brown II as a signal that the Court would 
not rigorously enforce Brown.30 Indeed, during the ensuing de-
cade, the Court effectively departed the school integration field 
and left Brown's implementation to southern circuit and district 
court judges while affording them little guidance.31 Cooper v. 
Aaron32 was the only major opinion involving desegregation 
that the Court issued between 1955 and 1963, and the contro-
versy surrounding the integration of the Little Rock schools 
probably necessitated the Court's decision in that case.33 
In November 1955, Virginia's Gray Commission issued a re-
port that expressed the view that separate public schools were 
in the best interest of both races. 34 The Commission also pro-
posed that the General Assembly pass a pupil placement statute 
vesting total authority in local school boards to assign pupils in 
ways that would most effectively promote the welfare of the 
localities and their schools. 35 The Gray Commission recom-
29. See, e.g., Black, supra note 28, at 22-31; Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's 
Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946·1960: An Oral History, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827-28 (1987); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 503-05. 
30. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 490-92. 
31. See Black, supra note 28, at 22-31; Carter, supra note 28, at 243-46; 
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 505-06, 512-13, 541. See generally JACK W. PELTASON, 
FIFI'Y-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
(1961) (surveying the responsP.s of federal courts after Brown). 
32. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
33. See id. "The Court spoke mainly when it absolutely had to: at the point of 
crisis when obstruction was so apparent, delay so prolonged, or violation of constitu-
tional principle so manifest that quiet was no longer feasible." Wilkinson, supra note 
9, at 506 (citations omitted); see DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 46-48, 126-27; Sanford J. 
Rosen, Judge Sobeloff s Public School Race Decisions, 34 MD. L. REV. 498, 502-03 
(1974). See generally DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK (1962) (giv-
ing a participant's perspective on the Little Rock crisis); TONY FREYER, 'l'HE LITTLE 
RoCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1984) (detailing the crisis). 
34. Report of Commission on Public Education, reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 
241 (1955) [hereinafter Gray Commission Report); see Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. 
Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Va.), affd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 
(1957). See generally PRATT, supra note 10, at 4-5 (providing a history of the Gray 
Commission and its findings). 
35. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 434; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 29-32 
(asserting that the North Carolina commission recommended a sinillar plan of local 
control). See generally Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools: 
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mended as well that no child be required to attend integrated 
schools and that the state supply tuition grants to parents who 
objected to integration or who lived in areas without public 
schools.as 
During spring 1956, Senator Byrd coined the term "Massive 
Resistance," and ninety percent of the congressional delegation 
from the South signed a "Southern Manifesto,'' castigating 
Brown as a "clear abuse of judicial power'' and vowing to reverse 
it.a7 During the same time period, the Virginia General Assem-
bly and a majority of the states that comprised the old Confeder-
acy adopted "interposition" resolutions.as The Virginia resolu-
tion announced the Assembly's "firm intention to take all ·appro-
priate measures honorably, legally and constitutionally avail-
able ... [in order] to resist [Brown's] illegal encroachment upon 
[Virginia's] sovereign powers" through judicial legislation.a9 
In late August 1956, Governor Stanley addressed a special 
session of the Assembly that convened to consider issues involv-
ing education.40 After proclaiming that the Old Dominion faced 
Troubled Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1450-51 
(1962) (giving a brief history of judicial reaction to the "massive resistance" policies 
of southern states). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 22-232.1 (Michie Supp. 1962) (divesting 
local school boards of pupil placement power and vesting the power in local "Pupil 
Placement Boards"). 
36. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 434; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 32-34 
(asserting that the first North Carolina commission rejected, but second commission 
endorsed, tuition grant and school-dosing proposals but noting that North Carolina 
never actually closed schools or paid grants). See generally GATES, supra note 25, at 
62-65 (providing historical background of tuition vouchers in Virginia); MUSE, supra 
note 19, at 148 (same). 
37. See JAMES W. ELY, THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VmGINIA 43 (1976) (discuss-
ing the Southern Manifesto); GATES, supra note 25, at 118 (noting that the Southern 
Manifesto "bore the names of nineteen senators and eighty-two representatives"); 
MUSE, supra note 19, at 147 (discussing Byrd's coining of "Mas~ive Resistance"); 
PRATI', supra note 10, at 6 (same). See generally BARTLEY, supra note 14, at 116-17 
(discussing the origin of the Southern Manifesto and Massive Resistance). 
38. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia adopted 
resolutions. See Douglas, supra note 1, at 93; see also Epps, supra note 15, at 22-25 
(giving a general history of interposition). 
39. S.J. Res. 3, 1956 Va. Acts 1213. See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 36-
39 (providing information about the Gray Plan and the doctrine of "interposition"); 
PRATI', supra note 10, at 5-7 (same); McKay, supra note 10, at 1017-39 (giving a 
thorough historical analysis of "interposition" and its origins). 
40. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 435. 
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the "gravest problems since 1865" and that Brown struck at the 
"very fundamentals of constitutional government," the governor 
submitted "recommendations to continue [Virginia's] system of 
segregated public schools."41 
During late September, the Extra Session of the Assembly 
passed a series of laws addressing desegregation that Professor 
Robert McKay of the New York University School of Law con-
temporaneously described as the "most intricate school legisla-
tion of all."42 The General Assembly found that the "mixing of 
white and colored children in any elementary or secondary pub-
lic school ... constitute[d] a clear and present danger affecting 
and endangering the health and welfare of the children and 
citizens."43 
The legislature enacted measures that prohibited racially 
integrated schools from receiving any state appropriations while 
prescribing tuition vouchers for students whose public schools 
closed because they integrated.44 The Assembly then proceeded 
to pass a pupil placement statute that placed authority in a 
specially constituted state board, thus rejecting the Gray 
Commission's recommendation that it vest complete power in 
local school boards.45 In doing so, the Assembly enumerated 
several criteria relating to school administration, educational 
policy, and student health, welfare, and safety, that the board 
was required to consider in assigning pupils to schools.46 Per-
41. Id. See generally GATES, supra note 25, at 167-90 (giving a detailed voting 
history of the Stanley plan). 
42. McKay, supra note 28, at 1225; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-5 to 253.2 
(Michie Supp. 1956) (providing Virginia legislation); cf. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 33 
(asserting that North Carolina adopted less legislation than did other southern 
states). 
43. Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 437. 
44. See id. at 436-42; see also Gray Commission Report, supra note 34, at 242 
(proposing tuition vouchers). For a discussion of tuition vouchers, see JEFFRIES, su-
pra note 10, at 135 (noting that a referendum to allow a voucher plan passed by a 
two-to-one margin); McKay, supra note 10, at 1043-49. 
45. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 436-42; see also PRATI', supra note 10, at 19 (sug-
gesting that the Assembly was concerned that "some school boards might not volun-
tarily accept massive resistance"). See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 36 (stat-
ing that control was removed from localities to avoid voluntary integration); McKay, 
supra note 10, at 1049-53 (discussing the North Carolina plan). 
46. Pupil Placement Act, 1956 Va. Acts, Extra Sess., ch. 70, § 3(1), (8); see 
Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 441-42 (listing the various factors). See generally Note, su-
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haps the most important factors were those respecting "efficient" 
operation of schools, which, by definition, proscribed the assign-
ment of whites and blacks to the same educational facility.47 
The Assembly enacted this legislation after black plaintiffs 
had instituted litigation in the Federal District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia in an effort to enjoin the continua-
tion of segregated public education in Norfolk and Newport 
News.48 Both local jurisdictions defended the statutory scheme 
by requesting that Judge Walter Hoffman, an Eisenhower ap-
pointee, dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for failure to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies.49 
In Adkins v. School Board, 50 Judge Hoffman extensively re-
viewed the legislative developments that had transpired in the 
Old Dominion since Brown and considered the placement statute 
together with the remaining measures.51 The court found the 
placement legislation to be unconstitutional on its face.52 The 
judge concluded that the enactment precluded the assignment 
entity from authorizing any desegregation, as this action would 
automatically terminate state appropriations, and ascertained 
that the legislation's definition of "efficient" mandated consider-
ation of race in making pupil assignments.53 Finding the pat-
tern of legislation clearly unconstitutional, the court flatly re-
fused to require that the plaintiffs exhaust administrative reme-
dies because those remedies were cumbersome and fruitless. 54 
pra note 35, at 1449-59 (giving the history of several pupil placement statutes). 
47. Pupil Placement Act, § 3(1), (8); see Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 441-42. For dis-
cussion of anti-NAACP measures that the Assembly included in the legislative pack-
age, see PRATI', supra note 10, at 8-9; Walter F. Murphy, The South Counterattacks: 
The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. POL. Q. 371 (1959). See also TUSHNET, supra note 12, 
at 272-300 (analyzing cases challenging the anti-NAACP legislation); F.D.G. Ribble, 
Constitutional Law, 44 VA. L. REV. 1350, 1352-57 (1958) (same). 
48. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 432. 
49. See id. at 432-33. See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1459-65 (discussing 
the doctrine of exhaustion as it related to the pupil placement legislation). 
50. 148 F. Supp. 430; see also McKay, supra note 28, at 1225-26 (affording helpful 
analysis of Adkins); Daniel J. Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils 
to Public Schools, 45 VA. L. REV. 517, 539-41 (1959) (same); F.D.G. Ribble, Constitu-
tional Law, 45 VA. L. REV. 1402, 1407-08 (1959) (same). 
51. See Adkins, 148 F. Supp. at 434-42. 
52. See id. at 436. 
53. See id. at 438-42. 
54. See id. at 442-45. See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1461-63 (explaining 
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Professor McKay observed contemporaneously that the "most 
carefully planned of all the state proposals, and the most sophis-
ticated in the nuances of the law, ha[d] proved also in a sense 
the most naive."55 
Six months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court in a per curiam opin-
ion.56 The appellate court rejected the exhaustion argument 
because it believed that the state placement statute afforded 
plaintiffs no adequate remedy.57 The panel observed that the 
district court's decree required neither that children be assigned 
to particular schools nor that they be assigned to racially inte-
grated public schools. 58 In discussing this decree, the court add-
ed that the two Brown decisions "do not compel the mixing of 
the different races in the public schools."59 On October 21, 
1957, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.60 
During November 1957, J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., who had been 
the Old Dominion's attorney general and who had argued Brown 
II for Virginia, was elected Governor. In Governor Almond's 
January 1958 Inaugural Address, he proclaimed that desegrega-
tion of the public schools would not be allowed in Virginia. 61 
During 1958, the Alexandria, Charlottesville, Norfolk, and 
the concept of futility as it related to placement acts). 
55. McKay, supra note 28, at 1226. 
56. See School Bd. v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 
(1957). The Federal Reporter changed the spelling of the named plaintiff to Atkins 
from Adkins. Compare id. with Adkins, 148 F. Supp. 430. 
57. See Atkins, 246 F.2d at 326-27. See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1460-61 
(discussing common reasons for not applying the exhaustion doctrine). 
58. Atkins, 246 F.2d at 327. 
59. Id. (quoting School Bd. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 
353 U.S. 910 (1957)). Chief Judge John J. Parker employed similar language in two 
earlier cases that significantly slowed integration's pace in the Fourth Circuit. See 
Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 9.10 
(1957) (holding that plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies); Briggs v. 
Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (stating that Brown "has not decided 
that the states must mix persons of different races in the schools"); see also 
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 507-08 (explaining Judge Parker's interpretation of 
Brown). 
60. School Bd. v. Atkins, 355 U.S. 855 (1957). 
61. See James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331, 334 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed per 
stipulation, 359 U.S. 1006 (1959). See generally PRATI, supra note 10, at 9 (describ-
ing Almond's political platform). 
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Arlington County school boards promulgated local pupil place-
ment plans. 62 The boards adopted these local measures in part 
so that they would have formal procedures and criteria, as the 
state placement act had proved ineffective, and in part as a 
response to the judicial decision invalidating the state placement 
legislation. 63 
In May 1958, the plaintiffs pursuing the Norfolk school deseg-
regation litigation, black schoolchildren seeking admission to 
schools previously attended exclusively by whites, sought addi-
tional relief from Judge Hoffman.64 The court denied their peti-
tion because the plaintiffs had not requested transfers from the 
school board.65 By July 25th, the board's deadline for receipt of 
applications, 151 blacks had applied.66 On August 18, the Board 
denied every request, articulating four reasons: (1) the assign-
ment of a few blacks among many white students would foster a 
harmful "sense of isolation," (2) the "peculiar circumstances 
would involve 'racial conflicts and grave administrative prob-
lems,'" (3) numerous applicants were scholastically ineligible to 
transfer, and (4) some black pupils who were qualified would 
have to transfer again in 1959, and that would not be "conducive 
to proper education."67 
Judge Hoffman invited the school board members to attend 
court on August 25th.68 The judge sustained the board's reason-
ing in rejecting the applications of students in the third and 
fourth categories, but he explained that potential isolation and 
racial tensions were legally deficient and asked the board mem-
62. See Meador, supra note 50, at 530. See generally PRATI', supra note 10, at 22-
25 (discussing the implementation of pupil placement boards). 
63. See Adkins v. School Bd., 148 F. Supp. 430, 445-46 (E.D. Va.) (invalidating 
state placement legislation), affd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 
(1957). 
64. See School Bd. v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1958) (describing events lead-
ing to the affirmance of the district court's denial of Virginia's motion to delay inte-
gration by one year); James, 170 F. Supp. at 334; see also PRATI', supra note 10, at 
10 (describing litigation that led to school closings in other Virginia localities); 
Ribble, supra note 47, at 1350-52 (analyzing Virginia litigation). 
65. Beckett, 260 F.2d at 19. 
66. Id. 
67. James, 170 F. Supp. at 334; accord Beckett, 260 F.2d at 19 (pro\'iding date of 
denial). 
68. Beckett, 260 F.2d at 19. 
1274 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1261 
bers to reconsider.69 On August 29th, the school board reported 
to the court that it would assign seventeen named plaintiffs who 
were scholastically eligible to six secondary schools that only 
whites had previously attended.70 The board also sought to de-
fer the black students' enrollment for a year.71 Judge Hoffman 
denied that request on September 2nd with leave to reconsider 
in light of Cooper v. Aaron, 72 an important school desegregation 
case that was before the Supreme Court. 73 
The Court's issuance of its opinion in Cooper on September 12, 
1958, led Judge Hoffman to file a memorandum on September 
18th rejecting the school board's deferment request.74 Five days 
thereafter, the school board sought a stay from the Fourth Cir-
cuit, which denied that petition but offered to convene a special 
session of the court in order to consider the appeal's merits. 75 
On September 27th, the Fourth Circuit heard the appeal and 
affirmed, signing an order that day and subsequently filing an 
opinion. 76 Immediately after the court ruled, the board assigned 
the seventeen black students to the six schools in controversy, 
which previously were comprised solely of white students.77 The 
same day, Governor Almond invoked the authority of the school-
closing law and issued a proclamation declaring that the six 
schools were closed. 78 
In response to Governor Almond's proclamation, several white 
schoolchildren who would have been enrolled in those education-
al facilities and their parents promptly filed suit seeking prelim-
inary and permanent injunctions restraining the enforcement, 
operation, and execution of most of the measures that the Gen-
eral Assembly had passed during its 1956 Extra Session. 79 Par-
69. James, 170 F. Supp. at 334. 
70. Id.; accord Beckett, 260 F.2d at 19-20. 
71. Beckett, 260 F.2d at 20. 
72. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
73. See Beckett, 260 F.2d at 20. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 18 (issuing opinion on October 2nd). 
77. See James, 170 F. Supp. at 334. 
78. See id. at 334-35 & n.3 (quoting the text of the governor's proclamation). 
79. See id. at 333; see also supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (describing 
the measures that the Extra Session had passed). See generally Ribble, supra note 
1996] SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA 1275 
ents were concerned that the legislative package would deprive 
their children of public education.80 Although these parents 
probably preferred segregated schools to integrated ones, they 
favored desegregated facilities to none at all. A three-judge 
court, consisting of Fourth Circuit Judges Clement Haynsworth 
and Simon Sobeloff and District Judge Hoffman, convened to 
hear the suit because the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief 
against several state officials.81 On January 19, 1959, the court 
held that the school-closing statute was unconstitutional.82 
First, the three-judge panel exhaustively reviewed the history 
of efforts by the state authorities and the local school board in 
response to Brown.83 The court then examined the condition of 
public education in the city of Norfolk since Governor Almond 
had ordered the six schools closed the preceding September. The 
panel initially observed that the seventeen black students whom 
the school board had assigned to facilities previously attended by 
whites were "not in attendance at any school."84 The court next 
considered the educational circumstances of the 10,000 white 
children who would have enrolled at the closed facilities and 
ascertained that nearly half of those pupils had received some 
private tutoring but that more than a quarter had been deprived 
of any education at all. 85 The court found that plaintiffs' coun-
sel had appropriately characterized the plight of the students 
and their teachers as "tragic."86 
The three judges held that the closing of public schools violat-
ed the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Four-
47, at 1352-57 (describing six acts, relating to NAACP cases, passed by the Extra 
Session). 
80. See Ribble, supra note 47, at 1351. 
81. See James, 170 F. Supp. at 333; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed 
1976); id. § 2284 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (describing the requirements, composition, 
and procedures for a three-judge court). 
82. James, 170 F. Supp. at 337. 
83. See id. at 333-35. See generally PRATI', supra note 10, at 10 (describing the 
closing of Virginia schools in 1958 under state massive resistance laws). 
84. James, 170 F. Supp. at 335. 
85. Id. at 335-36. See generally PRATI', supra note 10, at 10 (describing the closing 
of Virginia schools under the state massive resistance laws). 
86. James, 170 F. Supp. at 336. See generally MUSE, supra note 19, at 111-13 
(describing the tensions that ensued when black students were admitted to schools 
in five southern cities that had previously been all-white). 
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teenth Amendment. 87 The panel relied substantially on the re-
cently issued opinion of the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Aar-
on. 88 In Cooper, the Court declared that state support of segre-
gated public education contravened the Equal Protection Clause 
and proclaimed that students' rights "not to be segregated on 
racial grounds in schools so maintained [were] so fundamental 
and pervasive" as to encompass -due process. 89 
On the same day that the three-judge panel invalidated the 
state legislation, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an opinion 
in Harrison v. Day,90 holding that certain of those statutory 
requirements violated several provisions of the Virginia Consti-
tution that essentially prescribed the creation and maintenance 
of free public schools in the Commonwealth.91 The state court 
evaluated the legislation's validity in the context of the Virginia 
Comptroller's inquiry about the Old Dominion's reimbursement 
of local school boards that paid tuition grants.92 The Virginia 
Supreme Court also refused to consider whether the statutes 
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Consti-
tution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Brown and Coo-
per.93 The state court gratuitously deplored the ''lack of judicial 
restraint evinced by that court in trespassing on the sovereign 
87. James, 170 F. Supp. at 336-37. See generally PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 11 (dis-
cussing the court's ruling in James and the governor's responses to it). 
88. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also James, 170 F. Supp. at 337 (analyzing and apply-
ing Cooper). 
89. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 19. See generally FREYER, supra note 33 (describing the 
city of Little Rock before Cooper, the Court's ruling, and its aftermath); PRA'IT, su-
pra note 10, at 11 (discussing the Court's ruling in Cooper and the governor's re-
sponse to it); TRIBE, supra note 12, at 33-36, 40-41 (discussing the Court's decision 
in Cooper in relation to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)); Daniel 
Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 387 (discussing the constitutional history leading up to Cooper and 
analyzing Cooper under the Supremacy Clause). 
90. 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959). 
91. See id. at 645-46; see also PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 11 (discussing the court's 
ruling in Harrison); Ribble, supra note 50, at 1410-12 (discussing the opinions in 
Harrison). The federal court apparently delayed the issuance of its ruling until the 
Virginia Supreme Court had spoken on the same January 19th date, which was 
General Robert E. Lee's birthday and a Virginia state holiday. Epps, supra note 15, 
at 25. 
92. Harrison, 106 S.E.2d at 639. 
93. Id. at 647. 
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rights of [the] Commonwealth" and remarked that the legisla-
tion represented an "understandable effort to diminish the evils 
expected from the decision in the Brown case."94 
Notwithstanding the somewhat unusual manner in which 
Harrison arose, the court's invocation of the Virginia Constitu-
tion, and the court's unwarranted observations, this decision and 
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in James v. Almond effectively un-
dercut the Old Dominion's defiance. Professor Alexander Bickel 
astutely commented that the ''hard judicial attitude [evidenced 
in the two cases] achieved what had quite evidently been its 
aim. It broke the back of massive resistance."95 
When Governor Almond was forced to announce the public 
schools' opening, he committed an act that many Virginians, 
particularly in the Commonwealth's political establishment, con-
sidered to be an unpardonable sin for which they never forgave 
him. The Virginia Industrialization Group, an entity comprised 
of ninety state business leaders, apparently influenced the gov-
ernor by persuading him, in December 1958, that Massive Resis-
tance was impeding economic development substantially:96 "Al-
mond gave one last never-say-die speech, then made a dramatic 
about-face. On January 28, 1959, he spoke to the General As-
sembly and bowed to the inevitable. Five days thereafter, twen-
ty-one black children entered formerly all-white schools in 
Arlington and Norfolk. Massive resistance was over."97 
94. Id. 
95. Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Pros-
pects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193, 204 (1964); see also Epps, supra note 15, at 25 (de-
scribing the rise of the "Massive Resistance" era and the court's formal destruction 
of it in James). 
96. JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 151-53; see also GATES, supra note 25, at 96-99 
(identifying four groups of Virginia leaders in terms of views on desegregation). See 
generally JAMES C. COBB, THE SELLING OF THE SOUTH: THE SOUTHERN CRUSADE FOR 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1936-1980 (1982) (surveying the evolution of efforts to 
encourage industrial expansion in thirteen southern states); SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN 
AND DESEGREGATION (Elizabeth Jacoway & David R. Colburn eds., 1982) (discussing 
the role of southern businessmen in the development of the "new" South). 
97. JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 153; see also PRATI', supra note 10, at 11 (report-
ing Almond's final defiant pronouncement). In 1957, Charlotte, Greensboro, and 
Winston-Salem schools became among the first in the South to integrate by granting 
12 black students' requests to transfer to previously all-white schools. DOUGLAS, 
supra note 5, at 44. 
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"The Fourth Circuit then assimilated Virginia, which enacted 
a new pupil placement statute and began to administer it, to 
North Carolina."98 During the next several years, the appellate 
court thus refused to require that district courts entertain class 
action litigation seeking comparatively broad integration as long 
as school boards under the pupil placement measures admitted 
selected blacks to schools previously attended by whites.99 The 
Fourth Circuit only permitted a specific black plaintiff to sue on 
his or her own behalf-after exhausting administrative remedies 
prescribed in the legislation-and required the plaintiff to prove 
that the board had denied the individual's application expressly 
or necessarily for reasons that implicated race.100 The court's 
approach resulted in a small number of black students securing 
transfers, but the Fourth Circuit refused to recognize the effec-
tive continuation of segregated education and the federal courts 
implemented "no comprehensive plan."101 
By 1962, however, the Fourth Circuit had modified the man-
ner in which it proceeded. The court acknowledged that class 
actions were appropriate and rejected the requirement that 
individual plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies, 
refusing to tolerate any longer such practices as "interim mea-
sures only."102 Illustrative of the circuit's change in attitude 
98. Bickel, supra note 95, at 204; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-232.1 to .31 
(West Supp. 1962) (including Virginia pupil placement laws); PRATI', supra note 10, 
at 24-25 (describing the first major challenge in Richmond to the pupil assignment 
plan). See generally Epps, supra note 15, at 25~26 (discussing the demise of Massive 
Resistance); Note, supra note 35, at 1451-55 (discussing the rise of pupil placement 
legislation). 
99. See, e.g., Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); Beckett v. School Bd., 185 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. 1959), 
affd sub nom. Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960). See generally DOUG-
LAS, supra note 5, at 82 (discussing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board's limit-
ed geographic attendance plan); Note, supra note 35, at 1461-65 (discussing the 
futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine and the prohibition on bringing class 
actions); supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (discussing School Bd. v. Atkins, 
246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957)). 
100. These reasons had to ·be "unmixed with other plausible reasons, such as resi-
dential zoning, overcrowding in the white school, or the pupil's lack of aptitude as 
revealed by various tests," while the courts rather indulgently regarded such plausi-
ble reasons. Bickel, supra note 95, at 206. 
101. Id. at 205-06. 
102. Green v. School Bd., 304 F.2d 118, 124 (4th Cir. 1962); see Bickel, supra note 
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were 1962 cases involving desegregation of the Roanoke and 
Charlottesville public school systems in which the court "pierced 
the veil of tokenism, looked beneath at continued biracial zon-
ing, and demanded more comprehensive action."103 In the 
Roanoke litigation, the Fourth Circuit did not require the plain-
tiffs to exhaust administrative remedies prescribed in pupil 
placement legislation, ascertained that the city's methods for as-
signing students were infected with racial discrimination, and 
ordered Roanoke to develop a plan for complete compliance.104 
The appellate court evinced even greater stringency in the 
Charlottesville case.105 The court first found it "clear that little 
change ha[d] been made in the administration of the elementary 
schools from that which prevailed when the schools were com-
pletely segregated" and that ''little progress in the integration of 
the schools" would occur if the school board were "permitted to 
pursue the policy which, after mature consideration, it ha[d] 
deliberately adopted."106 The court then scrutinized and invali-
dated the board's plan for elementary schools because its pur-
pose and effect were to "retard integration and retain the segre-
gation of the races."107 
Soon thereafter, the pace of public school integration began to 
quicken in response to the actions of all three branches of the 
federal government. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,1°8 authorizing the Department of Health, Education and 
95, at 206-07 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Green). 
103. Bickel, supra note 95, at 206; see Dillard v. School Bd., 308 F.2d 920 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963) (challenging the Charlottesville school sys-
tem); Green, 304 F.2d 118 (challenging the Roanoke school system). See generally 
Rosen, supra note 33, at 508-10 (discussing the unequal administration of pupil 
placement programs). 
104. See Green, 304 F.2d at 124; see also Marsh v. County· Sch. Bd., 305 F.2d 94 
(4th Cir. 1962) (holding unconstitutional Roanoke's administration of pupil place-
ment). See generally Note, supra note 35, at 1460-61 (discussing the inadequacies of 
administrative remedies in the school segregation context). 
105. See Dillard, 308 F.2d 920; see also Rosen, supra note 33, at 507 n.53 (stating 
the Fourth Circuit's holding in Dillard); The Dillard Case, Desegregation, and the 
Doctrine of Non-Integration: A Review, 49 VA. L. REV. 367 (1963) (analyzing Dillard). 
106. Dillard, 308 F.2d at 922. 
107. Id. at 923; see also Jackson v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1963) (af-
fording an additional example of the Fourth Circuit's increasingly rigorous approach); 
Bradley v. School Bd., 317 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963) (same). 
108. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a 
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Welfare to terminate the federal funding of school districts that 
resisted integration, and numerous districts desegregated out of 
concern that they might lose those resources.109 The Supreme 
Court's resolve to enforce Brown with greater rigor apparently 
stiffened during the mid-1960s. This phenomenon was evidenced 
in opinions that required the Virginia localities of Prince Ed-
ward and New Kent counties to undertake much more vigorous 
desegregation efforts. 110 Judge John Minor Wisdom also wrote 
several important Fifth Circuit decisions that imposed affirma-
tive requirements on school districts to integrate and authorized 
increased judicial supervision of public education. m For exam-
to 2000n-b (1988 & Supp. V)). 
109. See DOUGI..AS, supra note 5, at 113, 124-26; ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND 
CONSTITUTION 177-78 (1992); James Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Deseg-
regation in the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 531-37. 
Numerous writers have suggested that the Court did not enforce Brown for a decade 
and that Congress ultimately became the agent of change. See, e.g., RoSENBERG, 
supra note 28, at 39-172; Klarman, supra note 2, at 9-10; McConnell, supra note 9, 
at 1133; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of 
the Court's decision in Cooper). 
110. For example, in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Su-
preme Court authorized the district judge to order that Prince Edward County re-
open and support a system of public schools that did not discriminate on the basis 
of race, id. at 234; see also Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 525-30 (discussing the signif-
icance of the Prince Edward case). See generally BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR 
SCHOOLS: PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1951-1964 (1965) (documenting race 
relations in the South); Jonathan L. Entin, Defeasible Fees, State Action and the 
Legacy of Massive Resistance, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 769 (1993) (analyzing the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virgin-
ia, Inc. v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740 (Va.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 907 
(1990), which upheld a whites-only provision in an educational trust). In Green v. 
County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Court read Brown II as charging the 
New Kent County School Board with the "affirmative duty to take whatever steps 
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination 
would be eliminated root and branch," id. at 437-38. See generally Rosen, supra note 
33, at 525-26 (discussing the Court's rejection in Green of the Briggs v. Elliott, 132 
F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1953), philosophy); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 522-30, 537-49 
(discussing the Prince Edward case and the freedom of choice concept in Green). 
111. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. 
Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966) (Singleton IJ); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Sepa-
rate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965) (Singleton D; see also DOUGLAS, supra 
note 5, at 126-27 (discussing Singleton I, Singleton II, and Jefferson); Wilkinson, 
supra note 9, at 541-49 (same). See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) 
(recalling the southern judges of the Fifth Circuit and their applications of Brown). 
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ple, Judge Wisdom observed that the "only adequate redress for 
a previously overt system-wide policy of segregation directed 
against Negroes as a collective entity is a system-wide policy of 
integration."112 
B. Petersburg 
Public officials in Petersburg monitored these activities in the 
rest of Virginia and the South.113 The developments seemed to 
leave the Petersburg public school system, which remained com-
pletely segregated, essentially untouched.114 Before 1958, Pe-
tersburg simply took no steps to integrate its schools and appar-
ently deferred to state authorities, such as the General Assem-
bly and the state pupil placement board.115 The Petersburg 
School Board did not adopt a local pupil placement plan, and it 
acted as if the desegregation litigation that involved other lo-
cales in the Commonwealth were irrelevant to public education 
in the city.116 
Until 1958, the General Assembly's efforts in fashioning, im-
plementing, and defending Massive Resistance and the Peters-
burg School Board's inaction enabled my white classmates and 
me to complete our primary school education at fully segregated 
Walnut Hill Elementary. There were no black students and no 
black teachers at Walnut Hill. We had no interaction with our 
counterparts who were enrolled in historically black primary 
schools, and the only contact that most of us had with blacks 
involved the domestic employees who labored in our households. 
During 1958, however, Reverend Wyatt Tee Walker-a civil 
rights advocate and a Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
official who had become the minister at Petersburg's Gillfield 
112. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d at 869 (emphasis omitted). For analy-
sis of school desegregation litigation from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s, see 
Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. 
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1975, at 7, 28-38; 
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 549-58. For analysis of subsequent litigation, see DOUG-
LAS, supra note 5; PRATT, supra note 10. 
113. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 25-26; PRATT, supra note 10, at 4. 
114. See PRATT, supra note 10, at 4-10. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. at 4-11. The Richmond School Board acted similarly. See id. at 19-20. 
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Baptist Church and who knew of the Adkins case-sued on be-
half of his school-aged children seeking the desegregation of 
Petersburg's public schools.117 Reverend Walker filed the case 
in the Richmond Division of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, where the district judge allowed 
the litigation to languish for several years, apparently because 
the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative reme-
dies by seeking transfers. 118 
After 1958, the Petersburg School Board, like numerous oth-
ers, developed and applied several stratagems for maintaining 
segregated public education and, failing that, for delaying any 
integration that was more than token. 119 Geographically cen-
tered assignment was one such technique. 120 Placing pupils in 
terms of their proximity to educational facilities maintained the 
segregated status quo at Walnut Hill Elementary School because 
no blacks lived in the relevant neighborhood. 
Assignment premised on geography had less efficacy in some 
areas of the city. For example, more black schoolchildren proba-
bly lived near AP. Hill Elementary School (named for a famous 
Confederate general), than did white schoolchildren. The rela-
tively centralized locations of the city-wide junior high and high 
schools that whites had always attended concomitantly compli-
cated efforts to employ geography as a means of perpetuating 
segregation. Another measure that the Petersburg School Board 
and a number of additional districts devised and employed was 
"freedom of choice," whereby students could ostensibly select the 
schools that they wished to attend.121 
117. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 856-57; see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE 
WATERS 245, 284-86 (1988) (detailing Reverend Walker's activities in Virginia and 
his appreciation of the Norfolk school closing). 
118. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text· (discussing Fourth Circuit 
treatment of exhaustion). 
119. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 32-36 (discussing delay tactics in North Carolina). 
120. See JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 141; PRATT, supra note 10, at 27. 
121. For discussion of freedom of choice, see KULL, supra note 109, at 176; PRATT, 
supra note 10, at 40-55; McKay, supra note 10, at 1053-55; Wilkinson, supra note 9, 
at 537-40. "Freedom of choice" had a deceptively egalitarian ring. The "problem with 
freedom of choice was the variance between theory and practice." Id. at 539; see also 
Walter Gellhom, A Decade of Desegregation-Retrospect and Prospect, 9 UTAH L. 
REV. 3, 5-8 (1964) (discussing delay of desegregation). 
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The deployment of these mechanisms probably enabled the 
school board to buy considerable time. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, some black parents and schoolchildren may have 
been unaware that the students could apply to transfer schools. 
Many of those blacks who were cognizant of this option may 
have been reluctant to pursue it for numerous reasons. For ex-
ample, most black parents and students would have confronted a 
bewildering array of obstacles in attempting to transfer or in ex-
ercising their freedom to choose. 122 A number of black parents 
and pupils probably found the application process daunting. 
Some may have been unwilling to expend innumerable hours 
completing lengthy written forms, collecting and furnishing 
significant quantities of written documentation, and answering 
irrelevant or insulting questions in personal interviews. Other 
adults and children may have been especially reluctant to devote 
substantial time and effort to a frustrating process in which they 
probably would encounter intransigent racist resistance, and 
ultimately, rejection. 
Many black parents also worked for whites who could impose 
economic pressures on their employees.123 Numerous black stu-
dents who considered applying knew that, in the extremely un-
likely event that the school board granted their transfer re-
quests, white pupils would scrutinize their every act, ridiculing 
and demeaning them.124 This hostile learning environment 
that awaited the black students may well have discouraged 
them. Some blacks might have been uninterested in attending 
122. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539-40 (listing obstacles facing parents and 
students); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 47-48 (discussing the barriers that 
black parents faced when challenging segregation in the courts). 
123. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 47-48; PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 42-43; Hodding 
Carter, Desegregation Does Not Mean Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1962, § 6 
(Magazine), at 21, 72. 
124. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 72 (describing the admission of Dorothy Counts 
to Harding High School in Charlotte); MUSE, supra note 19, at 114-15 (recounting 
the story of Dorothy Counts, who "was pursued by a rowdy crowd of juveniles ... 
jeering, spitting, and throwing pebbles, sticks and paper balls"); U.S. COMM'N ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1966-67, at 88 (1967); see also 
WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CML RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, 
AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 100-02 (1980) (discussing hardships that 
the first black high school students in Greensboro experienced); PRA'IT, supra note 
10, at 32-33 (discussing the experiences in Richmond). 
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schools formerly designated for whites or may have wanted to 
maintain exclusively black schools, particularly if they had equal 
resources. Not surprisingly, few blacks sought transfers or exer-
cised their freedom to choose in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
When some black students, despite insurmountable hurdles, 
eventually did apply, the Petersburg School Board relied on 
various delaying techniques and questionable tactics to avoid 
integrating the schools.125 One approach was the board's at-
tempt to freeze students in those schools in which they had orig-
inally matriculated.126 This meant that whites who began their 
primary education at Walnut Hill Elementary would remain 
there for five years and that blacks who commenced their pri-
mary schooling at racially segregated elementary facilities with 
fewer resources could not leave. 
When students obviated this difficulty by finishing their 
schooling at specific elementary or junior high facilities and then 
seeking to transfer, the school board had various responses. It 
could consider applications to be untimely, treat requests as 
incomplete and demand voluminous supplemental material that 
was costly and inconvenient to supply, or require personal inter-
views in which members asked burdensome, meaningless, or 
humiliating questions. 127 The board also could find the appli-
cants themselves scholastically deficient by employing unfair, 
irrelevant, or onerous testing mechanisms.128 
Those blacks who had the enormous fortitude and stamina to 
complete the arduous administrative process, but whose transfer 
requests the Board rejected, may have lacked the wherewithal to 
continue the fight by appealing adverse determinations. Many of 
these individuals probably had limited time, money, and energy 
to complete their applications, much less to pursue courtroom 
125. See JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 141; PRATI', supra note 10, at 13-14, 31, 36, 
42; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539-40. See generally Rosen, supra note 33, at 508-
10 (discussing the assignment system in Roanoke). 
126. See JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 141 (discussing this practice in Richmond). 
127. "Sometimes birth and health certificates, personal appearances and notarized 
forms were required." Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539. See generally DOUGLAS, supra 
note 5, at 63 (discussing the effect of attempted transfers). 
128. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 540 (discussing academically unprepared black 
students). 
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litigation.129 Even those blacks who might have entertained the 
thought of filing cases could have been dissuaded by the discour-
aging prospect of suing in the Richmond court of the federal 
judge who had delayed resolution of the Walker desegregation 
litigation since 1958.130 
Very few white parents or pupils manifested much interest in 
those schools that blacks previously had attended.131 Whites 
simply had little reason to enroll in educational facilities that 
had never received· as many resources, to attend schools in 
which the whites knew no students and would constitute a tiny 
minority, and to undertake an act for which they would be 
ostracized.132 In short, whites, who technically possessed con-
siderable freedom to choose, had minimal incentive to select 
schools previously attended solely by black schoolchildren. In 
contrast, blacks had little actual freedom to choose, and even 
the small number who exercised this option were unlikely to be 
successful. 133 
These machinations of the state and local school authorities 
easily enabled my white classmates and me to conclude three 
years at Anna P. Bolling Junior High School and most of our 
four years at Petersburg High School with little awareness that 
our city-wide schools might be desegregated. We did not know of 
the efforts that ostensibly had been undertaken on our behalf. 
For example, the school board automatically enrolled at Bolling 
Junior High all white students who completed their education at 
Walnut Hill Elementary or any other primary facility previously 
attended by whites while enrolling no pupils who finished their 
schooling at any of the black elementary schools, even though a 
number of blacks lived closer to that junior high school. 
Many students from Walnut Hill actually were more conscious 
129. See Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Ciuil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 
495-98 (1988-1989). See generally PRATI', supra note 10, at 38-39 (discussing the per-
sistence of some ppents); TuSHNET, supra note 12, at 34, 311 (discussing the 
NAACP legal staff). 
130. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; see also PRATI', supra note 10, 
at 40-55 (providing additional helpful analysis of freedom of choice); Wilkinson, supra 
note 9, at 539-49 (same). 
131. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 32, 42; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539. 
132. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 32, 42. 
133. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 539-40. 
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of class than of race. These Walnut Hill students, the families of 
whom owned expensive homes, drove fancy cars, and wore nice 
clothes, believed themselves superior to the blue collar pupils. 
Numerous whites from Walnut Hill had no greater contact with 
working-class whites than with blacks and accorded them little 
more respect. A number of the blue collar students justifiably 
resented the arrogant whites and vented this frustration by 
beating them up during recess and lunch. I escaped the terroriz-
ing by playing basketball on the playground with working-class 
pupils who did not participate in the fights. 134 
For many white students, the years in high school passed 
with few concerns about integration. Desegregation loomed 
somewhat larger only during my senior year, and what actually 
occurred at that time was mere tokenism. Even in high school, 
most white students remained oblivious to the measures that 
the city had instituted to limit integration. Petersburg High 
School had no black students or teachers throughout my fresh-
man, sophomore, and junior years, and I had virtually no con-
tact with my black contemporaries. 
To be sure, our faculty taught, and white pupils believed, that 
aggressive Yankees started the Civil War and bludgeoned into 
submission a valiant, severely disadvantaged South for reasons 
that were imperceptibly related to race. One history teacher 
delighted in proclaiming that John Wilkes Booth's birthday 
should be celebrated as a national holiday. Whites made depre-
cating comments about blacks and delivered racial epithets in 
educational and social settings. Much of my exposure to this 
type of activity came when playing basketball for the Petersburg 
Crimson Wave against schools with teams named for venerable 
Virginia lawyers, such as the John Marshall Justices. The most 
egregious incidents involved the apparently insatiable sexual 
drives of adolescent white boys from Walnut Hill. Ironically, the 
most virulen~ racists would boast in colloquial phrasing too 
134. Integration was closely linked to class. For example, in Little Rock, integration 
occurred first at Central High School, attended primarily by working-class whites, 
rather than at the school in Pulaski Heights, which was principally attended by 
upper-class whites. See FREYER, supra note 33, at 16-17. In junior high school, I 
remember having as few interactions with blacks and as few discussions of race as I 
had in elementary school. 
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crude to print how they had proven their manhood in 
Petersburg's black neighborhoods.135 
When a local attorney learned that I was considering atten-
dance at law school after college, he told me a similarly outra-
geous story. The attorney offered as part of the job description 
what a lawyer ·might do for his imaginary white male client who 
had impregnated a black woman. The attorney explained that 
the lawyer would offer the woman sufficient money to leave 
town and keep quiet, thereby protecting his client's interests. To 
this day, I have wondered why the attorney thought that this 
example would encourage me to attend law school. 
In my senior year, the Petersburg School Board, like many 
others, seized on the dilatory tactic of token desegregation by 
permitting a tiny number of blacks to attend Petersburg High 
School. I remember the first day of school in September 1963 as 
though it were yesterday. I was standing on the front steps of 
Petersburg High School preparing to begin my senior year. We 
were cocky and preoccupied with the trivialities that absorb 
teenagers-clothes, music, and sports. The preppies among us 
were sporting brand new madras shirts, Villager blouses, and 
Weejuns. 
I recall comparing my summer tan with that of one of the 
cheerleaders. We were as dark as many blacks whom the school 
board would not admit to our high school; however, the irony 
was completely lost on us. I had finished what I considered to be 
a successful summer, finely honing my basketball skills and 
waiting to be a high school hero. When the bell rang forcing us 
all indoors, several black students entered the building and 
became members of the class of 1964. In this utterly uneventful, 
anticlimactic manner, Petersburg formally integrated its public 
schools. 
The opening of a new Petersburg High School in 1970 repre-
sented the consummate irony of the city's desegregation battle. 
The school board originally had authorized the building's con-
struction in a location that was most distant from neighborhoods 
in which blacks resided, apparently to rely on patterns of resi-
dential segregation when placing students in schools. The Su-
135. See JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN 139 (1937). 
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preme Court criticized pupil assignments that were premised on 
geography immediately after construction commenced but before 
the new structure opened.136 This meant that considerable in-
tegration soon followed in Petersburg and that blacks became 
the principal beneficiaries of the state-of-the-art high school. 
During the late 1960s, the pace of public education's integra-
tion began to accelerate. For several years, many parents of 
white schoolchildren continued to support the public school sys-
tem. As integration of the Petersburg public schools increased, 
however, whites reduced their economic, moral, and other sup-
port of public education. By the early 1970s, most of the white 
parents whose children attended public schools were individuals 
who lacked sufficient resources to pursue other options. 
From the time that the Supreme Court issued Brown, numer-
ous white parents and pupils began exploring various alterna-
tives to public education. Some parents sent their children to 
preparatory schools, such as Episcopal High School in Alexan-
dria or St. Christopher's School in Richmond. A few students 
attended military schools, like those advertised in the New York 
Times Sunday magazine, or Saint Joseph's, the local parochial 
school. 
A number of white parents also created Bollingbrook Day 
School, which had such limited resources that it probably afford-
ed a considerably poorer education than did the public schools. I 
remember neighbors who purchased shares in the venture as a 
hedge for their children against threats that the public schools 
would close or would be fully integrated. I also recall a promi-
nent local physician who sent his two children to Bollingbrook 
and accepted state tuition vouchers when doing so. My mother 
severely criticized the doctor for abandoning public education 
and for taking the vouchers. The students who remained in 
public schools promptly ostracized the physician's children. 
No one in Petersburg established a Christian Academy like 
those that sprung up across much of Southside Virginia and the 
136. See Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 28; 
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 522-23. See generally JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 154-56 
(discussing school construction in Richmond); TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1490 (discuss-
ing the Court's decision in Goss). 
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rest of the South after Brown. As public school integration in-
creased, however, a growing number of parents sent their chil-
dren to Tidewater Academy, which was located twenty miles 
away. That activity exposed the hypocrisy of certain observers 
who criticized busing to achieve integration. 137 
III. INTEGRATION OF OTHER PUBLIC FACILITIES IN PETERSBURG 
This account of public school desegregation epitomizes similar 
developments involving the integration of other public facilities. 
For instance, during 1958, the Petersburg City Council voted to 
close Wilcox Lake, a substantial body of water owned by the city 
that was popular with white residents who had long used it for 
swimming, fishing, and picnicking.138 The Council apparently 
decided to terminate public use of the facility because it feared 
that Reverend Walker and other black leaders would seek to 
integrate the lake139 and because a 1958 Supreme Court deci-
sion seemed to mandate integration. 140 
I remember Wilcox Lake as one of the few oases available to 
local residents who sought relief from the unbearable heat and 
humidity that plague Southside Virginia during the summer. 
The recreation area also served as a social gathering spot for 
several generations of white Petersburg residents. My clearest 
recollections are· of high school football players who served as 
lifeguards, high school cheerleaders who worked in the bath-
house or the snack bar, and 1950 red Fords-the vehicle of 
choice for teenage males. 
In 1963, the city council reopened Wilcox Lake for fishing, but 
the lake has remained closed for swimming to this day.141 The 
137. Professor Douglas identifies the closely related irony that "busing was used 
extensively until the mid-1960s to maintain racially defined public schools" in North 
Carolina. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 44; accord PRATI', supra note 10, at 58. 
138. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 857. 
139. See id. 
140. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) 
(per curiam); see also Holley v. City of Portsmouth, 150 F. Supp. 6, 7 (E.D. Va. 
1957) (involving segregation of golf courses). See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 
58 (discussing "behind-the-scenes" desegregation); McKay, supra note 9, at 709-13, 
717-20 (discussing the legal challenges to the segregation of parks and public swim-
ming pools). 
141. See Tobias, supra note 9, at 857; see also MUSE, supra note 19, at 171 (report-
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council members apparently thought that a partial reopening 
was more likely to withstand legal challenge and to preserve 
what they probably viewed as the most important form of segre-
gation. The Council seemed very concerned about whites and 
blacks swimming in the same water body, interracial socializing, 
and all of the problems that the Council seemingly believed 
could result from those activities. 
Lee Park Golf Course, a municipal golf course that Petersburg 
named for General Robert E. Lee, may have presented an easier 
case on the law and the facts. During 1955, the Supreme Court 
had issued a per curiam opinion that clearly required integra-
tion.142 Moreover, this facility's integration might have seemed 
comparatively unthreatening. Relatively few blacks may have 
wanted, or could have afforded, to play golf, and the tiny num-
ber who did would only be sharing the course, the restroom, and 
the water fountains. When blacks requested that they be al-
lowed to use the facility, the city simply acquiesced. In the final 
analysis, Lee Park's desegregation probably had greater symbol-
ic than actual importance because golf was one of the most sig-
nificant trappings of white privilege. Indeed, many blacks proba-
bly were more concerned about earning a decent wage than 
playing golf. 143 
ing that the South Carolina legislature passed a resolution requesting the State 
Library Board to remove from circulation books that included illustrations of whites 
and blacks swimming together); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The 
Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 775 (1995) (affording a simi-
lar account of swimming areas in Cairo, Illinois). 
142. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955) (per curiam); see also 
Holley, 150 F. Supp. at 7 (abolishing the separate-but-equal doctrine in the context 
of golf courses). See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 60-61 (describing an inte-
gration dispute at a municipal golf course in Charlotte, North Carolina); McKay, 
supra note 9, at 713-17 (describing similar golf course cases that arose in Florida 
and Texas). 
143. Petersburg treated the public basketball and tennis courts similarly, perhaps 
for numerous analogous reasons, such as the Supreme Court rulings in Detiege, 358 
U.S. 54, and Holmes, 350 U.S. 879, and the Eastern District's ruling in Holley, 150 
F. Supp. 6, which required desegregation of municipal facilities. See also Wright v. 
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 292 (1963) (invalidating the prosecution of blacks for peace-
fully playing basketball on a pub1ic playground). See generally Entin, supra note 110, 
at 773-81 (describing Hermitage Methodist Homes of Virginia, Inc. v. Dominion 
Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740, 741 (Va.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 907 (1990), a case in-
volving a conveyance of land that was contingent upon the exclusion of blacks from 
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The Petersburg City Council voted to close the public library 
in May 1960, after hundreds of black residents staged several 
sit-ins seeking the library's integration.144 The building that 
housed the library was a private residence that Clara McKenney 
had donated to the city in 1924.145 The bequest provided that 
the main and second floors were to be maintained as a library 
for whites and that the basement, which was served by a sepa-
rate entrance, was to be a ~brary for blacks.146 The gift proba-
bly was considered progressive at the time of the donation be-
cause it made some provision for blacks. 
When blacks peacefully entered the library to protest its seg-
regation, Petersburg convicted in municipal court a number of 
the demonstration's participants, including Reverend Walker, for 
trespassing; however, the charges were dismissed on appeal to 
Petersburg Hustings Court.147 Petersburg's black citizens also 
filed suit in the Richmond federal district court seeking to inte-
grate the library.148 The library remained closed until Novem-
ber, when the city council reversed its decision and opened the 
facility to all residents. 149 
Local politics in Petersburg reflected similar attitudes. Thor-
ough exposition of the machinations that attended the city 
council's desegregation must await subsequent treatment, but 
Petersburg politics deserve brief examination here.150 Whites 
its use); McKay, supra note 9, at 720-21 (describing the integration of tennis courts). 
144. Tobias, supra note 9, at 858-59. See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 58, 
61 (describing the efforts to desegregate in Charlotte, North Carolina, after Brown); 
McKay, supra note 9, at 722-23 (describing the desegregation of public libraries); 
infra note 156 and accompanying text (describing sit-ins at private businesses). 
145. Tobias, supra note 9, at 855. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 860, 864-66. The judge may have been prescient. See Brown v. Louisi-
ana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (holding that the application of a disorderly conduct 
statute to blacks who peacefully assembled at a public library violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
148. Tobias, supra note 9, at 863. 
149. Id. at 867. 
150. To gain a sense of those machinations, see City of Petersburg v. United 
States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1022-27 (D.D.C. 1972), aff d, 410 U.S. 962, and aff d sub 
nom. Diamond v. United States, 412 U.S. 901 (1973). Authors have written entire 
books about voting rights. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 10; ABIGAIL M. 
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING 
RIGHTS (1987). 
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comprised only a bare majority of the city's population, but state 
and local authorities formulated and applied numerous mea-
sures to dilute black voting strength. For example, Virginia 
imposed various restrictions on suffrage, such as literacy tests 
and poll taxes, which meant that a relatively small number of 
blacks actually registered and voted. 151 
The city concomitantly devised and employed other techniques 
to limit black electoral power. For instance, when comparatively 
few blacks voted, city-wide or at-large balloting enabled whites 
to maintain control. Once more, when blacks secured the fran-
chise and approached a majority of Petersburg's electorate, the 
city resorted to annexing the overwhelmingly white suburbs in 
the surrounding counties.152 
During the early 1960s, whites who held moderate political 
views on racial issues commanded a Council majority, a phe-
nomenon that the library's reopening probably evidenced. In 
1964, a white candidate who favored segregation chose to run, 
and a black candidate who supported integration decided to seek 
office. Both won election, which splintered the Council, effective-
ly destroying the moderate coalition that had existed. Electoral 
politics thereafter became increasingly bitter and divided along 
racial lines. During 1968, blacks threatened to capture a majori-
ty of the city council's seats. This development apparently terri-
fied many whites and led to an "unusually large turnout of 
white voters in the white wards, as a result of which [the black 
incumbent] was defeated and the second black candidate also 
lost."153 
151. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 n.1 (1966) (describ-
ing a provision in Virginia's Constitution that required imposition of a poll tax); 
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 47 (1959) (describing a provision 
in North Carolina's Constitution requiring imposition of a literacy test); see also City 
of Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1025 (describing the restrictions on the ability of 
blacks to vote). See generally STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN 
THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976) (describing the process by which blacks gained the 
right to vote); TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1092-94 (explaining that conditioning the 
right to vote on poll taxes and literacy tests is unconstitutional); TuSHNET, supra 
note 12, at 99-115 (describing white attempts to exclude black voters and black at-
tempts to obtain the vote). 
152. See City of Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1022; see also PRATT, supra note 10, at 
47-48 (describing a similar annexation effort in Richmond). 
153. City of Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1026 (citation omitted). 
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Public sector employment in Petersburg manifested analogous 
considerations. The city integrated this area of great symbolic 
and practical significance with no more "deliberate speed" than 
it had public education. I remember that no blacks served in the 
Petersburg fire or police departments when I was attending 
public schools.154 Indeed, as recently as 1972, only one of sev-
enty fire fighters was black.155 
IV. INTEGRATION OF PRIVATE FACILITIES IN PETERSBURG 
Private facilities, such as restaurants and motels, that were 
open to the public pursued various courses of action in response 
to sit-in demonstrations at lunch counters and other businesses 
across the South.156 A few proprietors simply ceased opera-
tions. For example, Rucker-Rosenstock's, a large downtown de-
partment store, shut the doors of its Tea Room, where the up-
per-middle-class ladies of Petersburg had often lunched. 
Some owners were openly defiant. One downtownrestauranteur, 
whose establishment my family frequented for Sunday breakfast 
and for occasional suppers, posted prominently in the front win-
dow a large ''Whites Only'' sign. I did not understand why he 
needed to proclaim publicly his long-standing practice of refus-
ing service to blacks. 
Sit-in demonstrations by black residents and the public ac-
commodations provisions· that Congress included in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 forced most businesses to desegregate. 157 
154. Petersburg certainly was not alone in its discrimination against blacks in 
these departments. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleve-
land, 478 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1986) (involving race discrimination in the hiring and 
promoting of fire fighters); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 
565 (1984) (involving the underrepresentation of blacks in a fire department); Wil-
liams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1555 (5th Cir. 1984) (involving race 
discrimination in the selection, training, and promotion of police officers). 
155. See City of Petersburg, 354 F. Supp. at 1027 n.12; see also Martin v. Wilks, 
490 U.S. 755, 776-77 n.12 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recounting the history of 
racial discrimination in the fire and police departments of Birmingham, Alabama). 
156. See Daniel H. Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems 
of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315; Note, Lunch Counter Demonstrations: State 
Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 VA. L. REV. 105 (1961). 
157. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Tobias, 
supra note 9, at 857; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in 
places of public accommodation). See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 85-87, 96-
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For instance, the Trailways Bus Station, which was located next 
door to my father's office, eventually merged the waiting areas, 
restrooms, and drinking fountains that previously had· been 
separate. 158 
Numerous commercial entities initially avoided the issue alto-
gether. Some, by virtue of their geographic locations, were inac-
cessible to many blacks, particularly individuals who lacked 
private transportation. A few sold goods or provided services in 
which most blacks had little interest or that they could not af-
ford. A number of businesses merely relied on long-standing 
customs and patterns of commercial dealing. Few blacks may 
have wanted to enter stores in which members of their race had 
never shopped or to purchase goods from merchants who clearly 
discouraged black patrons. Indeed, old habits apparently die 
hard. For example, in a recent visit to a particular Petersburg 
restaurant, a premiere purveyor of southern barbecue and a 
longtime favorite of white diners, I noticed practically no blacks 
working or eating in the establishment, although numerous 
blacks purchased barbecue at the carry-out area, which has a 
separate entrance.159 
The local transportation company was called the Petersburg 
Bus Lines; however, the corporation was a quasi-private entity. 
The buses afforded a compelling illustration of the power of 
custom in matters of race. Custom dictated that whites sit in the 
front and blacks sit in the rear of buses in Petersburg, as in 
nearly all southern cities. I remember no blacks challenging this 
longstanding tradition. 160 State and local authorities 
97 (describing protests in Charlotte, North Carolina); Note, Recent Statute, The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARV. L. REV. 684, 687-88 (1965) (analyzing the Civil Rights 
Act's public accommodations provision). 
158. See PAULI MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT 138-49 (1987) (describing the 
1940 arrest of the book's author and a companion in Petersburg for challenging 
segregated seating on buses transporting interstate passengers). 
159. This practice was, and apparently remains, typical. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964) (providing a similar description of Ollie's Barbecue). 
160. See MURRAY, supra note 158, at 138-42, 232-38 (relating the consequences for 
blacks who violated this rule and discussing challenges to segregated seating on 
buses in Virginia). For discussion of Montgomery, Alabama, see Gayle v. Browder, 
142 F. Supp. 707, 711 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); FRED D. GRAY, Bus 
RIDE TO JUSTICE (1995). See also Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 239 
F.2d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 1956) (discussing South Carolina); DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 
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throughout the South would pursue disorderly conduct charges 
against individuals who had the temerity to violate that under-
standing-though few statutes or ordinances clearly mandated 
the arrangement, 161 and the Supreme Court had invalidated 
segregated seating on buses engaged in interstate travel in 
1946.162 
Ironically, an overwhelming majority of people who owned 
small businesses in the city indicated their willingness to serve 
all comers, regardless of race. In a poll conducted by the Peters-
burg Improvement Society, a biracial commission constituted at 
the city council's instigation to foster interracial dialogue, eighty 
percent of those surveyed responded affirmatively, although the 
results were not publicized. 163 
It is certainly easy to understate-and this account may unin-
tentionally oversimplify-the subtle and complex nature of the 
issues that were at stake in integrating all of these facilities 
during the decade aftei: Brown. To caricature all whites as rac-
ists and all blacks as heroes is too facile and simply incor-
rect.164 The reality was considerably more complicated for citi-
zens of both races. 
Some whites attempted to pursue comparatively moderate, 
58 (discussing Charlotte). 
161. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 160, at 50; MURRAY, supra note 158, at 138-45 
(recounting her arrest for disorderly conduct). See generally CATHERINE A. BARNES, 
JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT (1983) (exam-
ining the struggle to end segregation in southern transportation). 
162. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946); see also Gayle v. Browder, 
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (affirming the district court's decision invalidating intrastate 
segregated seating); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 
(D.D.C. 1972) (describing the "long history of racial segregation and discrimination" 
in Petersburg resulting from the "operation of laws, customs, and official and indi-
vidual behavior"), affd, 410 U.S. 962, and affd sub nom. Diamond v. United States, 
412 U.S. 901 (1973); Eastman, supra note 141, at 773-77 (describing Cairo, Illinois, 
similarly). 
163. Interview with individuals familiar with the Petersburg Improvement Society 
poll who requested anonymity; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 58-61, 86 (describ-
ing a similar commission and a similar poll in Charlotte). 
164. Cf. Patricia N. Limerick, The Canon Debate from a Historian's Perspectiue, 43 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 4, 7-8 (1993) (asserting that 15% of the members of every group are 
jerks). See generally NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESIS-
TANCE TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-64 (1971) (describing the movement of 
resistance against desegregation). 
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efficacious approaches, and a few even openly opposed Massive 
Resistance. Some blacks similarly tried to find relatively con-
ciliatory, effective courses of action. Although a number of blacks 
pressed for desegregation, numerous blacks were indifferent to 
or uncomfortable with integration, fearing that whites would 
retaliate against all blacks for efforts to end segregation. Some 
blacks apparently preferred to retain traditionally black schools, 
especially if they were fully funded. 
Illustrative of rather moderate, constructive approaches were 
the endeavors of the Petersburg Improvement Society in search-
ing for common ground and seeking to limit polarization on 
racial issues. The efforts of the blacks and whites who were 
involved in this work were laudable and unusual. It is difficult 
to overestimate the enormous pressures that people and groups 
that participated in these activities experienced. The slightest 
deviation from rigid opposition to integration could promptly end 
the careers of white public officials, teachers, and politicians.165 
Small business owners or attorneys who did not support sepa-
rate facilities might lose patrons or clients and become social 
outcasts in the white community. 166 
The sheer number and strength of segregation's proponents 
overwhelmed these persons and entities. Less moderate individ-
uals and organizations frustrated their efforts. For example, 
numerous white politicians capitalized on the fears and prejudic-
es of whites who had few resources or who were members of the 
lower or middle classes. Those whites, together with the re-
maining middle- and upper-class whites, comprised an electoral 
majority that usually could defeat the small, but growing, num-
bers of recently enfranchised blacks. In the end, it was probably 
unrealistic to expect that whites and blacks would immediately, 
or even "with all deliberate speed," overcome generations and 
centuries of ingrained racism, distrust, resentment, fear, and 
hatred and become fully committed participants in a common 
endeavor whose ultimate outcome promised to be uncertain. 
165. See, e.g., BARTLEY, supra note 14, at 192-93; Douglas, supra note 1, at 128; 
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 500-01. 
166. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (describing the ostracization of 
lower federal court judges in the South). 
1996] SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA 1297 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
To identify clearly and precisely all of the ramifications of the 
ten-year hiatus that ensued between the Supreme Court's issu-
ance of Brown and the integration of Virginia's public schools is 
virtually impossible. The Massive Resistance, delay, tokenism, 
and evasion practiced by the Virginia General Assembly and by 
the various city and county school boards enabled many local 
school districts to avoid any desegregation throughout the entire 
decade. 
On Brown's tenth anniversary, the percentage of black stu-
dents who were attending integrated public schools in Virginia 
was minuscule and differed minimally from North Carolina. 
Desegregation in t~e two states was nearly indistinguishable 
when one allows for significant variability between the Old 
Dominion's school districts in metropolitan areas, such as 
Hampton Roads and Northern Virginia, a number of which were 
comparatively responsive, and less urban locales, such as 
Southside Virginia, most of which were resistant. For instance, 
Norfolk integrated its schools in 1959, while Petersburg did not 
desegregate until 1963 and then only in a token manner.167 
All of the implications of the decade-long delay are difficult to 
delineate exactly; however, the profound actual and symbolic . 
nature of the consequences warrants an attempt to identify 
them. The passage of ten years without integration had subtle, 
complex, palpable, and intangible ramifications for individuals, 
groups, Virginia, and society that affected these people and 
institutions economically, politically, morally, and socially. 
The successful efforts to prevent integration by the General 
Assembly and the Petersburg School Board left my white class-
mates and me essentially untouched by Brown. The decade-long 
hiatus allowed many of us to remain ignorant of racial issues, 
particularly in school, and of black people as individuals. We 
could only dimly perceive that Brown's implementation had been 
delayed, and we had no sense of the education that our black 
contemporaries were receiving, much less of their personal lives. 
167. See supra notes 49-89 and accompanying text; supra part II.B. I recognize that 
Norfolk desegregated its schools only after lengthy and sharply contested litigation. 
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I can recall only a tiny number of serious conversations about 
racial questions during the whole period of my public education, 
and even fewer in homes, social contexts, or religious institu-
tions. Most persons and entities in Petersburg treated matters of 
race as taboo subjects for discussion, polite or otherwise, and 
effectively relegated them to irrelevance. I remember few whites 
who were troubled that blacks attended schools with limited 
resources or that state and local authorities were evading 
Brown's promise, while most whites had minimal contact with 
blacks. Whites who did voice these concerns or who had contact 
with blacks instantaneously were stigmatized and branded with 
the epithet "nigger lover."168 
The ten years that elapsed between the time of Brown's issu-
ance and integration meant that the 175 white students in my 
graduating class received public school educations that were 
nearly identical to those of their predecessors. The seventy-five 
pupils who successfully completed the college preparatory cours-
es of study easily gained college admission, and the students 
who wished to escape the insufferable insularity of a small 
southern town capitalized on that opportunity. Not a single one 
of my close high school friends now lives in Petersburg. 
I am uncertain what the decade-long delay meant for the 
black pupils who attended segregated schools, which, despite the 
mandate of Brown, remained separate and unequal during that 
period. 169 The stalling tactics of the General Assembly and of 
local school boards limited the promise of economic and social 
equality, fair treatment, and improved public education that 
Brown represented.170 So long as Petersburg could maintain 
segregated schools, the city would spend significantly more on 
the facilities that whites attended.171 To the extent that re-
sources constitute a measure of educational quality, black pupils 
apparently had decreased opportunities to acquire the schooling 
and skills that they would need to compete in an increasingly 
168. Se~ BARTLEY, supra note 14, at 192-93; RODDING CARTER, THE SOUTH STRIKES 
BACK 18 (1959); DOLLARD, supra note 135, at 46-48; PRATI', supra note 10, at 4. 
169. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 38; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 485-87. 
170. Cf. PRATI', supra note 10, at 4-10, 19-30, 54 (discussing stalling tactics). 
171. Id. at 15 (discussing the lack of funds and concern necessary to equalize black 
schools with white schools in Richmond). 
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complex world.172 Black students simply may have confronted 
greater obstacles to achieving what ostensibly remains one of 
America's most cherished dreams: the ability of individuals to 
realize their fullest potential as citizens. 
I believe that all pupils forfeited the benefits that would have 
resulted from basic, daily educational, political, social, and per-
sonal interactions among students of different races. This inter-
play might have begun the slow, arduous, painful, but critically 
important, process of breaking down the intractable, centuries-
old barriers that implicate race. That erosion had to await com-
paratively unsystematic interactions in other somewhat less 
congenial contexts, such as workplaces, the military, commercial 
dealings, and politics. 
Petersburg has not thrived in the period since the integration 
of the public schools. The decade-long delay and the years of 
overheated rhetoric may have contributed to, even if they did 
not precipitate, Petersburg's downward economic spiral. In fair-
ness, the city's financial outlook has not improved since the 
1950s, and it is impossible to identify conclusively a direct 
cause-effect relationship between the fiscal circumstances and 
what happened during the decade after Brown. 
Most of the major industrial employers terminated their Pe-
tersburg operations or relocated. For example, the Brown and 
Williamson Tobacco Company, which provided 7000 jobs-some 
for the 100 white graduates in the Petersburg High School class 
of 1964 who did not attend college-built a new plant in Macon, 
Georgia, and invited all employees of the Petersburg facility to 
relocate to Macon. The corporation wanted to install state-of-the-
art equipment and apparently wished to hire a less expensive, 
more compliant work force. Many of the whites in Petersburg, 
whose children now comprise less than five percent of the pupils 
attending public schools, cannot afford to send them elsewhere, 
while most of the remaining whites provide minimal support for 
public education. 173 
172. Id. (describing the inferior quality of resources in Richmond's black schools). 
173. Cf. DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 216 (describing the phenomenon of "white 
flight" in Charlotte); PRA'IT, supra note 10, at 48-53 (describing the phenomenon of 
"white flight" in Richmond). 
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The symbolic effects of the ten-year hiatus may have been 
nearly as deleterious as the very detrimental, pragmatic im-
pacts.174 Several harmful effects resulted from the Supreme 
Court's apparent willingness, out of a perceived need to assuage 
southern white sensitivities, to undercut Brown's moral 
force. 175 The Court eroded Brown by enunciating the "all delib-
erate speed" formulation, 176 by essentially acquiescing in the 
South's successful efforts to evade the law and to prevent inte-
gration, 177 by abandoning the school desegregation arena for a 
decade, and by concomitantly leaving enforcement to local, low-
er-court judges.178 The Justices undermined the Court's own 
prestige and power, sharply circumscribed its ability to function 
as a constructive instrument of social change, and exposed the 
limitations of purely legal approaches to complicated, controver-
sial societal issues.179 The Justices also dampened the aspira-
tions of many Americans and dashed the hopes, especially of 
blacks, that they would receive fair and equal treatment under 
the law.180 
VI .. EXPLANATIONS 
To ascertain how the Commonwealth of Virginia and the City 
of Petersburg were able to avoid integration of the public schools 
during the decade after Brown is a complex and subtle task. The 
coalescence of numerous factors, some of which are related, 
enabled the Old Dominion, Petersburg, and much of the remain-
der of the South to resist desegregation for most of the relevant 
period. 
One important explanation is that the Supreme Court essen-
174. See supra note 28. 
175. See supra note 28. 
176. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); see Tushnet & Lezin, 
supra note 28, at 1867. 
177. See Carter, supra note 28, at 243-44; cf. Burt, supra note 28, at 1483 (noting 
conventional accounts of the Court's acquiescence but arguing that other reasons 
may have motivated the Court's approach). 
178. See BICKEL, supra note 28, at 254; Carter, supra note 28, at 245-46; 
Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 486, 541. 
179. See RoSENBERG, supra note 28, at 72-93; Carter, supra note 28, at 246. 
180. See ROSENBERG, supra note 28, at 132-33. 
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tially left integration to ~outhern circuit and district court judges 
for the ten years following its announcement of the "all deliber-
ate speed" articulation in Brown Il.181 If the Court failed to ex-
hibit the clear, strong resolve, to exercise moral leadership and 
to afford the instructive guidance that might have led to Brown's 
rigorous effectuation, it is unclear why lower federal court judg-
es would have insisted upon integration's vigorous implementa-
tion. After all, those circuit and district judges came out of, and 
lived and worked in, the same society that had perpetuated 
segregation for centuries. 
Indeed, it is remarkable that so many federal judges, such as 
Judge Walter Hoffman of Virginia, Judge Frank Johnson of 
Alabama, and Judges John Minor Wisdom and Skelly Wright of 
Louisiana had the courage to ensure that Brown and the Consti-
tution received rigorous enforcement.182 Their actions assume 
even greater significance in light of the enormous pressures that 
state and local legislative bodies, politicians, lawyers, the media, 
and society imposed on these judges. Most of the judges received 
death threats, and a number of their fellow citizens treated 
them as pariahs. 183 
Another important explanation for Virginia's ability to limit 
integration during the post-Brown decade was a distinct south-
ern mentality.184 Many white residents of the Old Dominion 
had never forgotten the South's defeat in the Civil War or the 
· 181. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 505-06; see also id. at 541 (asserting that "[i)t 
is a measure of the Supreme Court's inconspicuousness that the most influential 
school opinions from Brown II to Green v. County School Board in 1968 were writ-
ten by two lower federal judges") (citation omitted); supra note 33 and accompanying 
text (noting that the Supreme Court decided only one major case involving desegre-
gation between 1955 and 1963). See generally PELTASON, supra note 31 (discussing 
the role of southern federal judges in school desegregation). 
182. See, e.g., JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE 
FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS (1993); BASS, 
supra note 111 (discussing Fifth Circuit judges); PELTASON, supra note 31 (discussing 
all southern federal judges); Abner J. Mikva, Remembering Skelly Wright, 98 YALE 
L.J. 211 (1988); supra notes 49-89 and accompanying text (discussing Judge 
Hoffman); supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Wisdom). 
183. See DOUGLAS, supra note 5, at 176; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 507; see also 
Roger K Newman, Black and Brown, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 635, 642 (1995) (describing 
ostracization of Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black for participation in Brown). 
184. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 19-20; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 495-505, 512-15. 
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conflict's aftermath.185 They remembered the ostensible reason 
for fighting the war-to maintain that "peculiar institution" of 
slavery-the perceived humiliation that the North had visited on 
the South during Reconstruction, the concomitant economic 
decline that most of the region had long suffered, and the appar-
ent disdain with which much of the remainder of the nation 
viewed the South.186 For numerous white Virginians, Brown's 
issuance and its imminent implementation may well have re-
sembled a second Reconstruction imposed by sanctimonious 
Yankees who maintained schools that were as segregated as 
many in the Old Confederacy but who claimed to know what 
was best for backward Southerners. 187 
Brown and its effectuation promised to strike at the very 
essence of the southern way of life for many whites, especially 
those with limited resources or who were lower or middle class. 
Particularly feared was the possibility of black "domination in 
all its forms: political, economic, social, and sexual."188 For in-
stance, if blacks registered and voted, they might have elected 
local office holders, imposed high assessments and taxes on 
whites, filled the schools and police departments with blacks, 
and called whites to task before the law.189 
Desegregated schools raised even more pointedly than voting 
the prospect of black control.190 Educated blacks could have 
been demanding; they would have sought, and might have se-
cured, everything imaginable, including jobs that previously had 
been the exclusive domain of whites. 191 Too much schooling 
185. See WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 170-71. 
186. See id. at 167-91. 
187. See, e.g., CARL M. BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUC-
TION (1977); JEFFRIES, supra note 10, at 131-39; PRATT, supra note 10, at 1-2. See 
generally MCMILLEN, supra note 164 (examining the history of the Citizens' Council 
and its resistance to desegregation). 
188. Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497; see also PRATT, supra note 10, at 29 ("At 
stake here was a way of life."). 
189. See ALEXANDER HEARD, A Two-PARTY SOUTH (1952); see also supra notes 150-
55 and accompanying text (discussing politics in Petersburg). See generally PAUL 
LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS & PARTY 79-97 (1963) (discussin~ the disfranchisement of 
black voters). 
190. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497. 
191. See id.; see also Henry L. Gates, Jr., A Dangerous Literacy: The- Legacy of 
Frederick Douglass, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 7 (Book Review), at 3 (noting the 
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would yield employees who were dissatisfied with performing 
menial labor as domestics or farm workers and who complained 
about their economic circumstances. 192 
The largest fear-even eclipsing concerns that blacks would 
dominate politics, education, or employment-was social.193 
The ~mage that struck terror in the hearts of many white South-
erners was social interaction between the races. The mere possi-
bility that both white and black students would attend school 
dances after football games or the junior prom was unthinkable. 
A contemporaneous account that appeared in the popular maga-
zine Look accurately captured these ideas: 
[Southerners] will tell you that sooner or later, some Negro 
boy will be walking his daughter home from school, staying 
for supper, taking her to the movies ... and then your South-
ern friend asks you the inevitable, the clinching question: 
"Would you want your daughter to marry a Nigra ... ?" 
[S]exual neurosis makes many white[s] impervious to logic. 
They are obsessed by the notion that Negroes, given a 
chance, will take over their women as well as their golf clubs 
and legislatures.194 
The white inhabitants of Southside Virginia, in the center of 
which stood Petersburg, held these attitudes most broadly and 
fervently. 195 Southside comprised the Commonwealth's black 
belt.196 Southside whites fully appreciated that compliance 
·with Brown would be most problematic in areas that had the 
largest black populations197 and that integration in locales 
with few blacks eventually could isolate the black belt.198 Poli-
disquiet of some abolitionists at Douglass's literary skill). 
192. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497. 
193. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 587 (1944); PRATT, supra note 
10, at 29; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497. 
194. William Attwood, Fear Underlies the Conflict, LoOK, Apr. 3, 1956, at 26; see 
ELY, supra note 37, at 97 (reproducing similar, but more subtle, statements of Sena-
tor Byrd and Governor Almond); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 497 (suggesting that 
"the driving fear was the least rational, and it was social"). 
195. See PRATT, supra note 10, at 1-4; ROUSE, supra note 10, at 9; WILKINSON, su-
pra note 22, at 9-22; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496. 
196. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496. 
197. See PRATT, supra note 10, at 4; Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496, 498. 
198. See Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 496, 498. 
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ticians from this region, therefore, developed and effectuated a 
strategy of rigid and absolute statewide opposition to integra-
tion. 199 In 1956, Mills Godwin, a Southside state senator 
who later served two terms as governor, summarized these 
views: "Integration, however slight, anywhere in Virginia 
would be a cancer eating at the very life blood of our public · 
school system."200 
The resistance to integrating public education in Virginia re-
flected certain economic, social, and geographic realities. It 
could also be ascribed to some important political 
practicalities. For instance, Massive Resistance was a central 
tenet of the Byrd machine, the powerful political organization 
centered in Virginia's courthouses, that Senator Harry Flood 
Byrd, Sr., established and perpettiated.201 Efforts to minimize 
school integration and to limit black political strength were 
thus intertwined. 
Phenomena relating to class as well could explain the opposi-
tion to public school integration. For example, integrated public 
education did not seriously threaten upper-class whites.202 
Those individuals rarely used public facilities, could afford to 
send their children to private schools, and had virtually no con-
tact with blacks, so that desegregated education would not 
jeopardize their prerogatives economically, politically, socially, 
or in workplaces.203 In sharp contrast, numerous whites who 
possessed limited resources or who were members of the lower 
or middle class, perceived public school integration as a pal-
pable threat to their financial, political, employment, and social 
circumstances. 204 
199. See id. at 498-99. 
200. 27 Backers of Stanley Plan Speak Out at Public Hearing, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 1956, at 1, 8; see also James Latimer, State Democrats Back 
Firm Segregation Policy: No Specific Plan Endorsed To Prevent Mixed Schools, RICH-
MOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 28, 1956; at 1 (reproducing a similar statement of 
Southside Representative William Tuck); supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text 
(noting political opposition to desegregation). 
201. See WILKINSON, supra note 22, at 113-14; see also supra notes 23-24 and ac-
companying text (discussing the "vociferous opposition" to desegregation). 
202. See PRATI', supra note 10, at 29-30. 
203. See id. 
204. See id. 
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Many ideas analyzed above illustrate the inherent limitations 
that constrain essentially legal approaches to complex societal 
issues. The Supreme Court's pronouncements, purporting to 
declare the law of the land and to interpret the Constitution, no 
matter how forcefully, elegantly, or morally phrased, were, in 
the final analysis, merely legal statements. 205 Intrinsic restric-
tions limit what courts can accomplish . by only proclaiming 
changes in the law without careful attention to efficacious im-
plementation and corresponding modifications in p"olitical and 
social attitudes. 206 
The law and legal institutions may not be particularly effec-
tive agents of social change, especially implicating issues as 
complicated · and co~troversial as race and integration. 207 
Some of these inherent limitations, pragmatic realities involv-
ing the effectuation of Brown and of integration, and some 
political and social practicalities coalesced to undermine the 
promise of Brown's legal holding during the decade following 
its enunciation.2~8 · 
Indeed, a few of the attorneys who pursued much of the high-
profile school and other desegregation litigation and certain 
individuals who participated in those suits and in activities, 
such as sit-in demonstrations that were intended to promote 
integration, recognized the limitations of the law and cases rela-
tively soon after the Court's issuance of Brown.209 For example, 
Thurgood Marshall appreciated- that legal solutions and litiga-
tion victories might not foster long-term improvements in soci-
ety, and this realization and frustration that litigation had be-
come less central to advancing civil rights may even have led 
him to resign as Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense 
205. Other commentatOrs have examined the ideas above, particularly in the con-
text of race and desegregation. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: 
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 51-74 (1987); BICKEL, supra note 28, at 68-
72, 250-54; RoSENBERG, supra note 28, at 72-93; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF JIM CROW 152-53 (3d rev. ed. 1974). 
206. See BICKEL, supra note 28, at 68-72, 250-54; WOODWARD, supra note 205, ·at 
152-53. 
207. See BELL, supra note 205, at 51-74. 
208. See RoSENBERG, supra note 28, at 72-93. 
209. See TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 268, 301-13 (focusing on Thurgood Marshall). 
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Fund.210 The contemporaneous statements of blacks who ac-
tively participated in endeavors aimed at desegregation are 
concomitantly replete with allusions to the limited efficacy of 
law, legal remedies, and litigation.211 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I have told one story of how the. Supreme Court's failure to 
ensure that Brown's mandate received rigorous implementation, 
in conjunction with Virginia state and local governmental 
authorities' efforts to prevent public school integration, delayed 
desegregation for a decade after Brown. This Essay has also ex-
amined the important consequences of not realizing Brown's 
promise and the-way in which this failure happened. The analy-
sis reveals that the Old Dominion's public schools experienced 
little more integration than did those of North Carolina, even 
though the Commonwealth couched its rhetoric in more defiant 
terms and judges scrutinized Virginia's educational system more 
closely. The Old Dominion did enjoy significantly less economic 
prosperity than did North Carolina, and the Commonwealth ar-
guably paid for its recalcitrance in terms of foregone financial 
development. This piece affords a snapshot of the ten-year peri-
od subsequent to Brown in Virginia and Petersburg. Consider-
ably more research analogous to the valuable work that Profes-
sor Douglas has performed remains to be undertaken on is1:1ues 
involving race and public schools in other states and localities 
during that time and the three decades since 1965.212 
210. See id. 
211. Contemporaneous newspaper accounts of the desegregation fight over the Pe-
tersburg Public Library included speeches by numerous blacks warning about these 
inherent limitations. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 9, at 865-66. 
212. Of course, some writers already have undertaken this work, and I have relied on 
it in this Essay. See, e.g., DOUGI..AS, supra note 5. Numerous other writers treat these 
issues broadly or examine specific states or localities briefly. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, 
III, The Other Desegregation Story: Eradicating the Dual School System in Hillsborough 
County, Florida, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1992); Klarman, supra note 5. It would be 
valuable to have additional analyses that concentrate on specific states and localities. 
Related developments in the North are beyond the scope of this piece; however, they 
too deserve analysis. See, e.g., RoNALD P. FORMISANO, BOSTON AGAINST BUSING: RACE, 
CLASS, AND ETHNICITY IN THE 1960s AND 1970s (1991); GEORGE R. METCALF, FROM 
LITTLE ROCK TO BOSTON: THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1983). 
